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COMMENT
THE HOSPITAL-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP:
HOSPITAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
MALPRACTICE OF PHYSICIANS
Since 19571 the courts in most states have moved rapidly toward
imposing vicarious liability on a hospital for the torts of employee-
physicians.2 In 1965 the Illinois Supreme Court3 held that a hospital
could be liable for the malpractice of a nonemployee-physician. This
comment attempts to describe these trends, to delineate the new rules
the courts are applying and to determine the rationale for adopting
these new rules. The comment assumes the patient has established that
the physician committed malpractice; the only issue addressed is
whether the patient can recover from the hospital for his or her inju-
ries.4 The scope is further limited to the liability of a private hospital;
thus governmental immunity, peculiar to state or federally owned
hospitals, is not discussed.5
A hospital's liability for a physician's malpractice is generally based
upon either of two theories: (1) corporate negligence or (2) respondeat
superior.6 Corporate negligence is based on a nondelegable duty of
the hospital owed directly to the patient,7 such as the duty of the hos-
pital to select its employees with care.8 Respondeat superior, on the
1. Bing v. Thunig. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
2. A "'physician" includes not only general practioners and surgeons, but also
radiologists, anesthesiologists, pathologists and other specialists.
3. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 I11. 2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 946 (1966).
4. This comment is not concerned with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or
with the requirement of expert testimony to determine the standard of care in mal-
practice cases, though each has a bearing on the material discussed.
5. In many jurisdictions, however, the same rules apply to both govern-
mental and private hospitals. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10
So. 2d 721 (1942).
6. Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 146,
151 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Southwick, CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.]; Southwick,
Vicarious Liability of Hospitals, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 153 (1960) [hereinafter referred
to as Southwick, MAEQ. L. REV.].
7. Southwick, CLEV.-MAR. L. REV., at 151, 152.
8. Mitchell County Hosp. Authority v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d
412 (1972) (hospital could not avoid liability for failing to select its physicians
with care by delegating the duty to its medical staff).
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other hand, is based on vicarious liability; the hospital is not liable
because it owes a duty directly to the patient,9 but because its relation-
ship with the physician and patient is such as to make it answerable
for the physician's malpractice.
Outside this basic framework, however, the doctrines in the various
jurisdictions regarding the hospital-physician relationship are diverse
and often completely unrelated. Thus, care must be exercised when the
results of a court in one jurisdiction are transferred to another juris-
diction, even though the factual setting may be identical. Such applica-
tion can be made only if the underlying doctrine in both jurisdictions
is substantially the same.10
Many recent decisions are premised on the notion that since pa-
tients in a sense choose their tortfeasors,' 1 the ordinary test of vica-
rious liability, the right of control test,' 2 is not functional. The control
test focuses merely on the relationship between the master and servant,13
while the test applied by most courts in the malpractice cases involves
the relationship between three parties: (1) the hospital; (2) the phy-
sician; and (3) the patient. 14
9. In these cases it is the doctor who commits the tort, e.g., in treatment
or diagnosis of the patient. The courts, however, sometimes get confused.
See Garfield Memorial Hosp. v. Marshall, 92 App. D.C. 234, 204 F.2d 721. 725
(D.C. Cir. 1953), where the court speaks in terms of the hospital's "duty."
10. An example should make the point clear. In Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308.
15 N.E.2d 365 (1938), the Indiana Supreme Court held that a corporation is not
a person, and that only persons can practice medicine under the Medical Practice
Act of that state. Thus, in Indiana the hospital is never vicariously liable
for the medical acts of a physician, whether salaried or not. In Washington.
however, the supreme court held in Bryant v. Sweet Clinic, 167 Wash. 166. 8 P.2d
972 (1932), that a corporation can practice medicine through its employee-physi-
cians. The point is that although the factual setting may be identical, an Indiana
decision is not relevant in Washington.
I1. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
12. McConnel v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949). The traditional
test is whether the "master" has the "right to control" the "servant" not only in regard
to the work to be done but also in the manner of performing it. See Parts I & Ill-A infra.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) [hereinafter cited RESTATE-
MENT (2d) AGENCY]: "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants com-
mitted while acting in the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT (2d) AGENCY
§ 220(): "A servant is a person employed . . . who with respect to the physical
conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's [the master's]
control or right to control." No mention is made of the relationship between the tort
victim and either the tortfeasor or the master.
14. Thus, the author has proposed a "two-way relation test." See Part I-B-I-b sttpre
The two prongs involve: (1) relationship of the hospital to the physician; and (2)
relationship of the hospital to the patient.
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One final observation must be made before examining the doctrines
which apply to the hospital-physician relationship. Traditionally,
whether a master-servant relationship exists has been a question of
fact for the jury to decide.15 Consequently, the courts generally discuss
the requirements of respondeat superior when considering whether
there are sufficient facts to permit a jury to conclude that a master-
servant relationship exists.16
I. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
The doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when a master-
servant 17 relationship exists.18 A principal-master may employ non-
agents, servant-agents or nonservant agents, but is liable only for the
torts1 9 of servant-agents or, more simply, servants. 20 Th courts often
state that a principal is liable under the doctrine for the torts of an
agent, but they still employ the tests of the master-servant relation-
ship.
To determine whether a particular agent is a servant, the courts
apply the right of control test:21 "[T] he essential test is whether he is
subject to the latter's [master's] right of control with regard not only
to the work to be done, but also the manner of performing it. ' '22 How-
ever, establishing that the agent is a servant is only the first prong of a
15. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811,291 P.2d 915 (1955).
16. The issue is generally presented upon an appeal from a motion for
directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. See note 61 infra.
17. The terms "master" and "servant" are synomous with "employer" and "em-
ployee" in the terminology of the cases and are used interchangeably. The Restatement
uses the master and servant terminology so as to distinguish the lay meaning of the
terms employer and employee: that A pays B a salary does not necessarily mean
that B is A's servant. RESTATEMENT (2d) AGENCY ch.7, topic 2, tit. B, Torts of Servants,
Introductory Note.
18. RESTATEMENT (2d) AGENCY § 219(1): "A master is subject to liability for the
torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment."
19. . The word "torts" includes intentional torts as well as negligence. RESTATE-
MENT (2d) AGENCY § 245.
20. RESTATEMENT (2d) AGENCY ch. 7, topic 2, tit. B., Torts of Servants, Introduc-
tory Note.
21. RESTATEMENT (2d) AGENCY § 220(1): "A servant is a person employed to
perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct
in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control."
22. McConnel v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243, 245, (1949). The court
was discussing the right to control test in the context of the borrowed ser-
vant doctrine. See Part I-B-3 infra.
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two prong test. It must also be established that the servant committed
the tort in question within the "scope of his [or her] employment."2 3
Thus, the master is liable to third persons for torts committed by
servants acting within the scope of their employment.2 4
The antithesis of a servant is an independent contractor. An inde-
pendent contractor may be an agent of the principal, but can never be
a servant-agent.2 5 A principal, therefore, is not liable for the torts of
an independent contractor.2 6 Thus, the distinction between the servant
and the independent contractor is crucial to the determination of an
employer's liability.2 7
A. Evolution of the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior as Applied to
the Hospital-Physician Relationship
1. Jurisdictions which refuse to apply the doctrine of respondeat
superior
It must be noted that not all jurisdictions apply the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior to the hospital-physician relationship. Some have
decided that a hospital is never vicariously liable for the medical acts
of physicians.28
There are three reasons that a particular jurisdiction may reject the
doctrine as it applies to the hospital-physician relationship: (1) the
charitable immunity doctrine; . : (2) the professional skill of a physi-
23. RESIA]ENIEN I- (2d) AGENCY § 228.
24. See note 18 .sitpra.
25. See note 17 .supra.
26. RESTATEMENT (2d) AGENCY § 250.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 29-31 infra.
29. Courts have used four theories to support charitable immunity: (I)
trust fund, MacDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.. 120 Mass. 432
(1876) (to impose liability upon the hospital would misappropriate the donor's
funds to persons and purposes he did not intend to benefit: the trust funds
would be dissipated in damages); (2) implied waiver, Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hosp.. 211 N.Y. 125. 105 N.E. 92 (1914): Downs v. Harper Hosp..
101 Mich. 555. 60 N.W. 42 (1894) (when a patient enters a nonprofit hospital.
patient waives any action for negligence against benefactor, the hospital): (3)
nonapplicability of respondeat superior. Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp.. Inc..
269 N.C. 1. 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967): Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp. 66 Conn. 98. 33 A.
595 (1895) (rationale that vicarious liability should be imposed only when the servant
is employed to produce a profit for his or her master): Hoke v. Glenn. 167 N.C. 594,
83 S.E. 807 (1914) (not liable under respondent superior, but is liable for corporate
negligence. e.g.. negligence in the selection and retention of personnel): (4) public
388
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cian;30 and (3) the medical practices acts.31 The first two reasons are
remnants of the reasoning in Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital,32 a case which was central to the evolution of the doctrine of
respondeat superior as applied to the hospital-physician relationship.
The third reason is an aberration common to only a few jurisdictions.33
2. The citadel--Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital
The doctrine of charitable immunity and the professional skill theory
were discussed by the New York Court of Appeals in the celebrated
case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital. In Schloen-
dorff, two physicians performed unauthorized surgery in a charitable
hospital. Writing for the court, Justice Cardozo approved the doctrine
of charitable immunity but found it inapplicable because the unau-
thorized surgery was an intentional tort (battery).34 Nevertheless,
Cardozo found that under the professional skill theory the hospital
policy, Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408. 78 A. 898 (1910). There
are two divergent policy grounds for the immunization of the charity: (1) the charity,
like government, serves the public good, and should be afforded the same immunity
as government, University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219
(1907); and (2) it is far better for a few individuals to suffer than to deprive a com-
munity of the charitable institution, Southwick, MARQ. L. REV., supra note 6, at 160-61;
Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P.2d 645 (1938)
(Folland, C.J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp.. 12 R.I. 411 (1875) (dictum).
31. See, e.g., Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N.E.2d 365 (1938), where the
Supreme Court of Indiana held that since a corporation is not a person, and
since only persons can be licensed under that state's medical practices act,
a corporate hospital could never practice medicine, and because it cannot practice
medicine it cannot be held liable for the malpractice of its physicians. However.
since the hospital can perform nonmedical functions, it is clear under the lterman
rationale that a hospital is responsible for the administrative acts of its
physician-employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See note 44 &
accompanying text infra. Medical practice acts are those statutes by which
states regulate the practice of medicine and license physicians and nurses.
32. 211N.Y. 125, 105N.E. 92(1914).
33. See, e.g., Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N.E.2d 365 (1938); Dickerson
v. Malliard. 175 N.W.2d 588 (Ia. 1970). Compare Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363,
149 P.2d 372 (1944) with Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Colo. 280,
443 P.2d 708 (1968).
34. 105 N.E. at 93. Cardozo stated that charitable hospitals are not liable
for the professional negligence (malpractice) of physicians on the basis of two theories:
(1) a patient of a charitable hospital impliedly waives any action against the hospital
for the torts of its employees; and (2) the relationship between a hospital and a
physician is not one of master-servant, but rather the physician is an independent
contractor because of his professional skill and learning. Id. However, Cardozo applied
only the second rationale in this case because operating upon a patient without consent
was an intentional tort which could not be impliedly waived.
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was not responsible for the tort of the two physicians. Cardozo correctly
reasoned that it was impossible for the "lay" hospital to exercise any
right of control over the medical acts of physicians. The hospital, he
reasoned, merely provided the facilities to be used by the physicians. 35
This reasoning proved enduring; for more than half a century
Schloendorff guided many American courts.36
3. The fall of the citadel-Bing v. Thunig
In 1957 the New York Court of Appeals overruled Schloendorff,
clearly rejecting both the charitable immunity doctrine and the profes-
sional skill theory in Bing v. Thunig.37 In Bing, a nurse failed to re-
move linen which was soaked with an alcohol-based antiseptic. Later
while the surgeon was using. an electric cautery, the linen caught fire
and the patient was burned. The patient's suit against the hospital was
based on the negligence of the nurse.38
The court rejected the charitable immunity doctrine observing that
the Massachusetts case which imported the doctrine to the United
States was based on an English decision that had been previously
overruled. 39 In addition the court noted that since liability insurance is
now available to protect the hospital from financial disaster immunity
is no longer required for economic existence. 40 Lastly, the court noted
that a hospital today is run like a business, quite different from its
predecessors that were dependent on donations and volunteer work
for their survival. 41
35. Id. at 94.
36. See, e.g., Runyan v. Goodrum. 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921); Rosane
v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372. (1944): Steinert v. The Brunswick Home.
172 Misc. 787. 16 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1939), affd, 259 App. Div. 1018. 20 N.Y.S.2d
459 (1940): Clary v. Hospital Authority of Marietta, 106 Ga. App. 134. 126
S.E.2d 470 (1962); Duling v. Bluefield Sanitorium, Inc., 149 W. Va. 567, 142 S.E.
2d 754 (1965); Williams v. Randolph Hosp., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953).
37. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). Of late. Schloendorff
has also found rough going in other jurisdictions. See Rabon v. Rowan
Memorial Hosp., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967) (rejected both the implied
waiver theory and the professional skill theory of Schloendorff, though apparently
considered them both to be aspects of charitable immunity); Beeck v. Tuscon Gen.
Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972) (rejected Schloendorfi.
38. The fact that the employee of the hospital involved was a nurse, as opposed to a
physician, made no difference under the professional skill theory of Schloendorff.
105 N.E. at 94-95. Thus, Bing is just as applicable to physicians, though it involved a
nurse's negligence.
39. 143 N.E.2d at 5, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
40. Id. at 7, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
4 1. Id.
390
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The court also rejected the second ground of Schloendorff, i.e., that
physicians and nurses "were to be regarded as independent contrac-
tors rather than employees because of the skill they exercised and the
lack of control exerted over their work .... -42 The court indicated
several reasons for this rejection. First, other workers such as airplane
pilots, locomotive engineers and chemists are skilled in their profes-
sions, yet the doctrine of respondeat superior applies to them and their
employers. 43 Second, the court noted the impossibility of intelligent,
consistent application of the administrative act-medical act distinc-
tion 44 which had evolved from the Schloendorff rationale. Third, the
court observed that a hospital is not simply a place where medical
treatment is rendered; rather it is an institution which itself renders the
medical treatment through its employees. As the court stated:45
They [hospitals] regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of
physicians, nurses and interns, as well as administrative and manual
workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treatment, col-
lecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action.
The majority of the states have followed the reasoning in Bing, re-
jecting both the doctrine of charitable immunity and the professional
skill theories of Schloendorff.46 These jurisdictions apply the doctrine
42. Id. at 6-7, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8.
43. To point to this analogy does not, of course, address the problem of
why any of these persons should be considered servants when there is no
right of control. But the court was, perhaps, alluding to the problem of applying
the traditional test to a specialized society. As employees become more
specialized, the control by employers over their work diminishes, and under
the right of control test, respondeat superior becomes increasingly difficult to
apply. To save the doctrine from extinction, some way had to be found to apply
the doctrine to the specialists.
44. 143 N.E.2d at 4, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 6. The court stated:
[A] consistent and clearly defined distinction between the terms [adminis-
trative and medical acts] has proved to be highly elusive. Placing an improp-
erly capped hot water bottle on a patient's body is administrative. . ., while
keeping a hot water bottle too long on a patient's body is medical. ...
Administering blood to the wrong patient is administrative. . ., while ad-
ministering the right blood to the wrong patient is medical. . . .Employing
an improperly sterilized needle for a hypodermic injection is administrative. ...
while improperly administering a hypodermic injection is medical. .. . Failing to
place side boards on a bed after a nurse decided they were necessary is adminis-
trative. . .. while failing to decide that side boards should be used when the
need does exist is medical.
45. Id. at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
46. See, e.g., Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. I, 152
S.E.2d 485 (1967) (court rejected both the implied waiver theory and the pro-
fessional skill theory of Schloendorff, though apparently considering them both
391
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of respondeat superior to the hospital-physician relationship. Given
application of the doctrine, the question remains under which factual
situations will the hospital be vicariously liable for negligence of a
physician.
B. Jurisdictions Which Apply Respondeat Superior to the Hospital-
Physician Relationship
1. What is a physician-servant?
a. Rejection of the right of control test.47 When applying the doc-
trine of respondeat superior to the hospital-physician relationship it is
important to recognize that the traditional right of control test is un-
workable. Central to the control test is the master's right of physical
control over the details of the servant's work.4 8 The lay board of
directors or lay administrators of hospitals obviously do not exercise
any control over the medical treatment rendered by physicians even if
the physicians are salaried. Moreover, it would be a violation of most
state medical practices acts for the directors to attempt to exercise such
control.4:9 Thus, although the courts still frame the issue in terms of
the right of control, they necessarily ignore it whenever they hold a
hospital liable for the malpractice of a physician. .t, The question,
then, is: what test are the courts applying?
to be aspects of charitable immunity): Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz.
App. 165. 500 P.2d 1153 (1972) (rejects Schloendor[).
47. See text accompanying note 21 iipra.
48. See note 21 .stpra.
49. Willcox, Hospitals and the Corporate Practice oJ" Medicine, 45 COR ,LIL
L.Q. 432 (1960). The author comments:
IWle believe there is no danger of lay interference in the diagnosis of the
patient's ailment, in the decision upon the course of treatment, or the
carrying out of that decision. We know of no suggestion that interference
of this sort has been a problem.
Id. at 445-46. As to the illegality of lay control, the author states: "The employment
of a physician, except by another physician, raises peculiar problems because lay
control of the manner and means of performance of his professional duties is for-
bidden by law [i.e., most state medical practices acts]." Id at 451. The author's
point is that hospitals in fact do not exercise control over their salaried physicians, nor
could they under most state medical practices acts. Id. at 438-40 nn. 12-14.
50. If a court does not merely pay lip service to. but attempts to apply the
control test, it will find itself enmeshed in a doctrinal quagmire. For example.
in Beeck v. Tuscon Gen. Hosp.. 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972). the
court rejected the administrative act-medical act distinction. However, it then not
only paid lip service to the control test, but also attempted to apply it. A
392
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b. The Brown test. In Brown v. La Societg Frangaise de Bien Fais-
ance Mutuele,51 the California Supreme Court suggested a two-
pronged test for application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to
the hospital-physician relationship. The court in Brown held the sur-
geon involved was a servant because: (1) the plaintiff sought treatment
from the hospital not from the surgeon; 52 and (2) the surgeon was a
salaried employee of the hospital. The court made no reference to the
right of control test; these two factors alone were sufficient to warrant
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus the Brown de-
cision suggests a two-pronged test for deciding in what circumstances
a hospital will be vicariously liable for the torts of a physician:
(1) The relationship between the hospital and the patient; i.e.,
did the patient seek treatment primarily from the hospital?
(2) The relationship between the hospital and the physician; i.e.,
did the hospital pay the negligent physician a salary?
The courts which apply the doctrine of respondeat superior to the hos-
pital-physician relationship have sub silentio substituted this two-
pronged Brown test for the unworkable right of control test.53
The first prong of the test departs significantly from the traditional
right of control test. Under the control test, a court is concerned only
with the relationship between the principal and the agent; if that rela-
tionship is one of master-servant, then respondeat superior applies.
However, the Brown test also requires the court to consider the rela-
tionship of the patient to the physician and to the hospital because,
unlike the usual tort cases, the victims of malpractice in a sense choose
their tortfeasors. The malpractice victim is not injured by a stranger,
radiologist had neglected to set the descent-arresting stop on an x-ray machine,
and, as a result, a patient's spine was punctured by a needle. The court found
that the hospital had the "right of control" because it could clearly regulate the
operation of its x-ray department to the extent of requiring the stop device to
be in place. This is merely an application of the administrative act-medical act
distinction which the court purported to reject. The point is that once the court
actually applies the control test, if it recognizes the hospital has in reality
only lay control, it by necessity will be deciding whether the act was adminis-
trative or medical, notwithstanding the court's claims to the contrary. For a
discussion of the administrative act-medical act distinction, see note 103 infra.
51. 138 Cal. 475,71 P.516(1903).
52. 71P. at516.
53. See, e.g., Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Gilstrap v.
Osteopathic Sanitorium Co., 224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S.W.2d 249 (1929); Way-
nick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952); Gustui v. C.H. Weston Co.,
165 Ore. 525, 108 P.2d 1010 (1941).
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as in an automobile accident; rather, he or she has chosen a particular
physician or a particular hospital for treatment. It is hardly surprising,
therefore, that in deciding whether the hospital should be liable for
the malpractice of a physician the courts consider from whom the pa-
tient was primarily seeking treatment. 54
In satisfying the second prong of the test, i.e., the relationship be-
tween the hospital and the physician, the courts consider only one
factor-whether the physician was salaried by the hospital., 5 This
insures a close association between hospital and physician before vi-
carious liability is imposed on the hospital. The Missouri Court of Ap-
peals stated in Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanitorium Co.5 6 that in deter-
mining whether a physician is salaried, the court should consider
whether the physician's compensation is independent of how many
patients he treats.57 There are, of course, many methods of compen-
sating a physician. For example, the hospital may pay a radiologist a
percentage of the gross receipts of the radiology department. But
where the compensation is not pure salary, the courts hold the hospital
liable for the torts of the physician, not on a master-servant basis, but
under such doctrines as "ostensible agency. 58
54. See, e.g., Sepaugh v. Methodist Hosp. 30 Tenn. App. 25, 202 S.W.2d 985
(1946). The court held the hospital liable for the tort of an intern pointing out that
the patient had no choice in the selection of the intern, and that there was no
contract between the two; the intern's services were part of the services
furnished by the hospital.
55. Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952) (charitable
immunity not argued by counsel; court held the resident surgeon a servant be-
cause paid $42.12 a month for his services); Gustui v. C. H. Weston Co..
165 Ore. 525. 108 P.2d 1010 (1941) (alternative holding, physicians held to be
servants); Treptau v. Behrens Spa, 247 Wis. 438, 20 N.W,2d 108 (1945).
See Southwick, MARQ. L.R., at 167, where the author states:
Salary does not necessarily mean the hospital has a right to control a
professional person's activities . . . . Nevertheless, some cases
have held that the payment of a salary to a staff physician or other profes-
sionally-trained person renders the doctrine of respondeat superior
applicable so that the hospital becomes vicariously liable for the negligence
of the recipient of the salary.
56. 224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S.W.2d 249 (1929) (alternative holding).
57. The physician in Gilstrap was negligent in performing a tonsillectomy.
and as a result the patient died. The court pointed out that whether the physician
treated I or 150 patients, his "salary" was the same. Since he was "salaried."
he was a servant of the hospital even though the operation was not performed
in the defendant hospital!
58. See, e.g., Howard v. Park, 37 Mich. App. 496, 195 N.W.2d 39 (1972).
The medical center called on Dr. Lawrence to do surgery from time to time. The
clinic split the profits 50-50 with the physician. The court said that while Dr.
Lawrence was in fact an independent contractor, the clinic was still respon-
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Thus, courts which apply the Brown test uniformly hold that a
physician is an independent contractor where: (1) the patient initially
goes to the physician for treatment, who then chooses the hospital in
which to treat the patient; and (2) the physician receives no salary
from the hospital, but bills the patient independently for the medical
treatment rendered.59 In this situation, it is irrelevant whether the
physician has "staff privileges" at the hospital since such privileges
merely permit the physician to use the hospital facilities for his or her
private patients. 60 The typical family physician is treated as an inde-
pendent contractor. On the other hand, the same courts will always
hold that a physician is a servant of the hospital where: (1) the patient
goes directly to the hospital for treatment; and (2) the hospital pays
the physician a salary.61 Thus, a hospital is generally liable for the
negligence of interns and residents62 since they are salaried by the
sible for his negligence based on the theory of "ostensible agency."
The terms "ostensible agency," "apparent authority" and "holding-out theory"
are synonymous as used by the courts.
59. See, e.g., Mayers v. Litow, 154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 316 P.2d 351 (1957)
(hospital not liable for physician's negligence, physician an independent con-
tractor); Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 671, 235 N.E.2d
671 (1968) (directed verdict for hospital); Hundt v. Proctor Community Hosp., 5 IUI.
App. 3d 987, 284 N.E.2d 676 (1972) (also rejecting joint venture argument); Fioren-
tino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296 (1967) (hospital held not liable
for physician's failure to obtain patient's "informed consent").
The patient in Mayers sued the hospital and the physician for his negligence
in performing a thyroidectomy. The physician was a member of the staff and
had performed many operations in the hospital. In holding thet he was an
independent contractor as a matter of law, the court emphasized that the physi-
cian: (1) merely used hospital facilities; (2) received no compensation from
the hospital; (3) arranged for the patient's visit to the hospital, after the patient
had first come to him; and (4) he privately billed the patient for his services.
60. Mayers v. Litow, 154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 316 P.2d 351, 354 (1957).
61. See, e.g., Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S.E.2d 153
(1939); Bryant v. Sweet Clinic, 167 Wash. 174, 8 P.2d 972 (1932) (surgeon);
Garfield Memorial Hosp. v. Marshall, 204 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (salaried
assistant surgeon); City of Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. 2d 721
(1942) (intern); Sepaugh v. Methodist Hosp., 30 Tenn. App. 25, 202 S.W.2d 985
(1946) (intern); Koubeck v. Fairview Park Hosp., 17 Ohio App. 2d 53, 172
N.E.2d 491 (1960) (resident physician); Bowers v. OIch, 120 Cal. App. 2d
108, 260 P.2d 997 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (resident surgeon); James v. Holder,
34 App. Div. 2d 632, 309 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1970) (anesthesiologist); Moeller v.
Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952) (resident physician).
In many of these cases, the courts simply affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff or
decided that sufficient facts existed to permit jury consideration of the agency issue.
Thus, it may be more accurate to state that the courts will always affirm a jury finding
of agency when the two prongs of the Brown test are satisfied.
62. See 4B L. FRUMMER, PERSONAL INJURY § 1.05(2) (1970): "Residents
and interns, unlike fully licensed physicians and surgeons engaged in
private practice, are, in almost all jurisdictions, held to to be employees of the
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hospital and have no private patients of their own." 3 It is suggested
that the courts should grant a directed verdict when either of these fac-
tual patterns arise.
Unfortunately, not all hospital-physician relationships fit into the
neat fact patterns set out above. The facts do not clearly establish that
the physician is either an independent contractor or a servant under
the two prongs of the Brown test where: (I) the patient seeks partic-
ular treatment primarily from the hospital, but the hospital does not
pay the physician a salary; 4 and (2) the patient seeks particular treat-
ment primarily from the physician, but the hospital pays a salary to
the physician. The cases in the area discuss the first factual pattern in
terms of ostensible agency and the second in terms of scope of em-
ployment. The question is generally whether the court will permit a
jury to find that a master-servant relationship exists between hospital
and physician.
2. Scope of employment and ostensible agency
a. Scope of employment. In almost all cases, the courts have stated
the traditional rule that the physician must be a servant acting within
the scope of employment '5 before respondeat superior will apply.
Very few courts, however, have actually held a hospital not liable
for the tort of a physician because he or she was acting outside the
scope of employment. This rarity may be attributable to the fact
that a salaried resident physician must treat private patients who have
sought treatment primarily from him or her before the question will
arise. Most salaried physicians do not have private patients.
hospital rather than independent contractors." See elwo Restatement (2d)
Agency § 223. Comment a:
So likewise, while the physician employed by a hospital to conduct opera-
tions is not, in the normal case, a servant of the hospital. yet it may be
found that the house physician or the internes. if subject to directions
as to the manner in which their work is performed, are servants of the
hospital while in performance of their ordinary duties.
63. Southwick, MARQ. L. REV., supra note 6, at 171.
64. See note 67 infia.
65. See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp.. 18 Ariz. App. 165. 500 P 2d II5
1972); Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp.. 269 N.C. I. 152 S.E.2d 485. 492
(1967). quoting Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8. 163 N.Y.S.2d at 10-11 ("The test should
be . . .was the person who committed the negligent injury-producing act one of
its employees and, if he was, was he acting within the scope of his employ-
ment.")
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In a leading case on scope of employment, Smith v. Duke Uni-
versity,6 6 the defendant university employed a physician to teach at the
medical school. Though the university paid the physician a salary to
treat "free ward" patients at the university's hospital, they also al-
lowed him to use the hospital facilities for private practice when there
was a paying patient. The plaintiff arrived at th.e hospital without any
preference for a particular physician, and, because she was a paying
patient, was referred to the physician.67 The court pointed out that the
hospital did not bill paying patients, but rather the physician billed
them directly. The court held that when the physician undertook to
treat the patient he was acting outside the scope of employment; he
was engaged in private practice and was acting upon his own respon-
sibility. The hospital was not, therefore, liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.68
66. 210 N.C. 628, 14 S.E.2d 643 (1941) (alternative holding). In 1941 North
Carolina followed the charitable immunity doctrine (non-applicability of respondeat
supe]ior theory). See Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N.C. 594, 83 S.E. 807 (1914). However,
in Smith v. Duke University, the immunity rule was apparently not argued by the
hospital; it was not discussed in the opinion. In a later decision, again
involving Duke University Hospital, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
if the issue of charitable immunity is not raised, a resident surgeon could
be an employee of the hospital for purposes of respondeat superior. Waynick
v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952). Thus, it appears that neither the
charitable immunity doctrine nor the professional skill theory could adequately
explain the result in Smith. Nevertheless, the language of the court suggests
it rested its decision on two grounds: (1) scope of employment; and (2)
professional skill theory of Schloendorff. In the author's opinion, the former
was the stronger rationale.
67. Referrals present a difficult problem under the first prong of the Brown
test. When a patient arrives at the hospital without a private physician, and the
hospital refers the patient to a member of its staff who is nonsalaried, to
whom does the patient look for treatment? It depends perhaps on the degree of
choice the patient is able to exercise. For example, if the hospital administrator
introduces the physician to the patient and asks if the physician is suitable,
the patient probably looks toward the particular physician for treatment. Even
where it is more mechanical, i.e., where the hospital by-laws automatically provide
that a physician on rotation duty (see note 83 infra) is the private physician
of certain patients, some courts have found the referral effective to make the patient
primarily a ward of the physician, not the hospital. See Part I-B-2-b(3) infra.
68. See also Haven v. Randolph, 342 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1972). In Haven,
Dr. C. was the patient's private physician. Dr. R. was Chief of Surgery at the
hospital and was salaried by the hospital to care for patients who had no
personal physician. Dr. R. could have private patients under his employment
with the hospital. Both Dr. C. and Dr. R. allegedly negligently treated the patient.
The court stated: "A hospital is liable for the tort of a physician only if he is
employed by the hospital and/or acts as agent for the hospital." Id. at 542.
The court cited Smith v. Duke University for the proposition that here Dr. R. was
acting upon his own responsibility, and not the hospital's, in regard to this
particular patient. In effect, then, he had stepped out of the "scope of employment."
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b. Ostensible agency. The doctrine of ostensible agency applies
when the patient proceeds directly to the hospital for treatment or
seeks particular treatment primarily from the hospital, but the hospital
pays no salary to the physician. Though the court finds no "mas-
ter-servant" relationship in fact exists (because no salary is paid), :1
the hospital may still be liable for the physician's negligence under the
doctrine of ostensible agency.70
(1) Ancillary treatment. The doctrine of ostensible agency originated
in the ancillary treatment situation, in which the patient is sent to the
hospital by a private physician and a nonsalaried specialist negligently
administers treatment. In a leading case on ostensible agency, Seneris
v. Haas,71 Dr. Haas, the patient's private attending obstetrician, had the
patient hospitalized during which time she was paralyzed as a result of
a negligently administered spinal anesthetic. Dr. West, the negligent
anesthesiologist, 72 was one of a group of anesthesiologists who per-
formed services at the hospital, but who were not salaried by the hos-
pital. The court held that the hospital could be vicariously responsible
under the theory of ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr. West.
The court defined ostensible agency as one in which "the principal
intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, causes a third person to
believe another to be his agent who is really not employed by him. "'73
69. See, e.g., Howard v. Park. 37 Mich. App. 496. 195 N.W.2d 39 (1972). in
which the physician was paid 5011e of the profits but not a "'salary.'" The court
found he was in fact an independent contractor, but nevertheless held he %vas
liable inder the doctrine of ostensible agency.
70. See, e.g., id. (surgeon); Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp.. 175 Ohio St. 133. 191
N.E.2d 821 (1963) ("agency by estoppel"--pathologist): Seneris v. Haas. 45 Cal. 2d
811. 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (anesthesiologist).
Other courts have reached the same result uinder the term. See, e.g., Brown v.
Moore. 247 F.2d 711 (3rd Cir. 1957) (alternative holding-physician in sani-
tarium); Schagrin v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,-Del. Ch.-, 304 A.2d 61
(Super. Ct. 1973). Some courts state alternatively that the hospital cannot
escape by delegating the responsibility of treatment to independent contractors.
See Vaughn v. Memorial Hosp., 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925) (physicians):
Jenkins v. Charleston Gen. Hosp. & Training School, 90 W. Va. 230. 110 SE.
560 (1922) (radiologist); Schagrin v. Wilmington Medical Center. Inc.. stpret; Stuart
Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S.E.2d 153 (1939): Gustui v. C.H.
Weston Co.. 165 Ore. 525, 108 P.2d 1010 (1941) (alternative holding). .ee 1ilo
Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanitorium Co., 224 Mo. App. 798. 24 S.W.2d 249 (1929)
(alternative holding-"apparent authority"); Rural Educ. Ass'n v. Bush, 42
Tenn. App. 34, 298 S.W.2d 761 (1956) ("apparent authority").
71. 45 Cal.2d 811,291 P.2d 915 (1955).
72. A "borrowed servant" problem, see Part I-B-3 infra, is created by this
three-way relationship with the patient. As to this patient. is Dr. West the
servant of the hospital or of Dr. Haas? The court simply ignored the issue.
73. 291 P.2d at 927, qttoting Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic.
54 Cal. 2d 141, 128 P.2d 705 (1942). The court listed three decisive factors: (I)
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Many commentators have disagreed with the analysis of Seneris
and its progeny.7 4 They argue that although the doctrine of ostensible
agency is logically sound in a contractual setting, where it originated,
it is not sound in a tort setting. A "principal," in contract law, through
intentional or negligent conduct, might cause a third person to believe
X was the principal's contractual agent. Relying on that conduct, the
third person might enter into a contract with X and perform. In such a
situation, the courts hold the principal contractually bound because X
was an ostensible agent.75 However, as the commentators point out,
this rationale does not work well in tort cases. For instance, how can a
hospital "intentionally" or "negligently" represent an anesthesiologist
to be a servant? What is "negligent" in permitting an anesthesiologist
to work at the hospital, the only place one can practice such a special-
ized trade? Moreover, how does the patient "rely" to any real extent
on these supposed "representations" that the specialist is an employee
and, therefore, recover from the hospital?76
all the equipment was supplied by the hospital; (2) the anesthesiologists
served only this hospital; and (3) they were on regular duty at the hospital.
The same result could have been reached in Seneris by holding that the hospital,
once it undertakes to treat the patient (as it does for ancillary treatment), cannot
escape liability by delegating responsibility for treatment to an independent
contractor. Some courts state that the hospital is estopped to deny that the specialist is
an employee of the hospital. See, e.g., Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp., 175 Ohio St. 133,
191 N.E.2d 821, 823 (1963): "[T] he hospital by its conduct represented and induced
a belief that Haws [a pathologist on contract with the hospital] was in its employ as a
part of its regular establishment, whereby it was estopped to successfully claim otherwise."
74. The commentators do not necessarily abhor the result, but, rather, find
doctrinal inconsistency. See, e.g., Hanson & Stromberg, Hospital Liability for
Negligence, 21 HAST. LJ. 1, 7-8 (1969):
The doctrine of apparent agency reflects the judicial antipathy toward, and illu-
strates the judicial circumvention of the independent contractor doctrine. There
is no apparent significance in whether or not the relationship between the physi-
cian and hospital is such that the public believes that the physician is acting as
the hospital's agent; nevertheless, the doctrine of apparent agency has hastened
the decline of the independent contractor doctrine [see Southwick, MARQ. L.
REV., at 170]. It is true that in each of these cases the hospital has been the one
who selected or supplied the doctor for the patient. Traditionally, however, this
has not been and should not be recognized as enough standing alone to impose
vicarious liability. Certainly, a physician, a hospital, or a private individual who
supplies or recommends a physician to a patient has not been nor should he be
liable for the latter's malpractice unless they are partners or unless there is
negligence in the recommendation.
Compare Southwick, CLEv.-MAR. L. REV., at 155, where Southwick discusses
ostensible agency but does not reiterate his earlier criticism of the doctrine.
75. See RESTATEMENT (2d) AGENCY §8, and accompanying notes.
76. Southwick, MARQ. L. REV., supra note 6, at 171. Southwick suggests the courts
should be certain before applying the doctrine that the hospital has truly made a
"misrepresentation."
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These arguments are persuasive. One must note, however, that the
special characteristics of the malpractice tort place it somewhere be-
tween pure tort and pure contract. Unlike most tort cases, in which
the tort victim is injured by a stranger, the malpractice victim at least
chooses the institution within whose walls injury may occur. In addi-
tion, it is submitted that the courts have not ignored the second prong
of the Brown test (salary), but instead have substituted a "significant
relationship test" 77 where salary is absent. While the courts rather
mechanically78 apply the doctrine of ostensible agency to the ancillary
treatment situation, a "significant relationship" between the hospital
and the specialist is almost always present. These specialists usually
have their offices at the hospital, treat all their patients there and serve
no other hospital.7 51 By holding the hospital responsible, the courts are
simply recognizing that the hospital generally provides the services of
specialists.
(2) Contractual emergency room treatment. This factual pat-
tern arises when an association contracts with the hospital to provide
"E.R. doctors." The hospital pays the association, and the association
pays the physicians. These physicians are specialists in emergency
room treatment and often work eight hours a day, five days a week.
This situation differs from the ancillary treatment situation because
the patient has no private attending physician; that role is filled by the
emergency physician.
77. The "significant relationship test" replaces the requirement of "salary" where
the patient clearly looks to the hospital to provide treatment. While the courts appear
to state that the first prong of the basic test alone is enough. it is suggested that in
fact they are looking for at least some minimum contacts other than mere "staff
privileges" between the hospital and physician as well.
78. The conclusionary statements of the courts seem to suggest they are looking
only at the patient-hospital relationship. See, e.g., Rural Educ. Ass'n v. Bush. 42 Tenn.
App. 34, 298 S.W,2d 761 (1956), where the court found that the patient thought
these were "hospital doctors" and "reasonably so." In Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811.
291 P.2d 915 (1955), the court concludes by noting that the patient was not obligated
to inquire whether each person who attended her at the hospital was an employee or
an independent contractor.
79. See. e.g., Kober v. Stewart, 148 Mont. 117, 417 P.2d 476 (1966). in which a
radiologist, while taking x-rays of an 80-year-old man caused him to slide into a
squatting position. The patient suffered a fractured thigh and a crushed knee and
sued the hospital. The radiologist was chairman of the department of radiology and
was supplied by a clinic to the hospital under a contract by which the hospital was
to pay the radiologist 35% of the gross profits of the department. The trial court
granted a summary judgment for the hospital, but the supreme court reversed.
Rather than speaking in terms of "ostensible agency," the court pointed out that it
was a factual question whether the radiologist was a servant, since the hospital
supplied all of the facilities and the radiologist practiced only at that hospital.
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An excellent example of this factual pattern arose in Schagrin v.
Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.80 in which the hospital contracted
with a partnership known as the Doctors For Emergency Services
(D.F.E.S.) to staff the emergency room of the hospital. Through the
negligence of these doctors, plaintiffs decedent was killed. The hos-
pital argued that the D.F.E.S. doctors were independent contractors.
The summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of the hos-
pital was reversed on appeal. The appellate court held that once the
hospital undertakes to render a certain type of treatment it cannot, by
employing an independent contractor, avoid liability for injuries
resulting from negligent performance of the duties assumed by the
independent contractor.81 The court also relied on the "holding-out"
theory82 to find an issue of fact necessitating trial. As in the ancillary
treatment cases, the result in Schagrin suggests that the court, in fact,
applied a significant relationship test in place of the second prong of the
Brown test (salary). Since the emergency room treatment in Scha-
grin was a service provided by the hospital, and since the emergency
specialists did all their work at the hospital, a sufficiently significant
relationship existed between the hospital and the physicians to establish
the hospital's vicarious liability.
(3) Referral treatment. The referral treatment factual pattern arises
when a patient presents him or herself at a hospital and is referred to
a non-salaried physician who negligently injures the patient while per-
forming rotation duties pursuant to active staff membership.83 The
referral cases put the Brown test to its severest trial because the two
80. -Del. Ch-, 304 A.2d 61 (Super. Ct. 1973). Compare Pogue v. Hosp.
Authority, 120 Ga. App. 230, 170 S.E.2d 53 (1969), where, on precisely the same
facts, the Georgia court held that the partnership of physicians who contracted with
the hospital to operate its emergency room were independent contractors. However,
under Georgia law, a hospital is liable under respondeat superior only where the act
performed by the physician was administrative. Thus, the jurisdiction either follows
some form of charitable immunity or the professional skill theory of Schloendorff.
See, e.g., Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S.E. 103 (1923); Clary v. Hosp.
Authority, 106 Ga. App. 134, 126 S.E.2d 470 (1962); Jeter v. Davis-Fischer Sanitarium
Co., 28 Ga. App. 708, 113 S.E. 29 (1922). If Georgia does not follow the Brown
test, its decision in Pogue is inapplicable in jurisdictions, such as Delaware, which do
follow the test.
81. See cases cited in note 70 supra.
82. Id.
83. "Active staff membership" means only that the physician performs rotation
duty in the hospital, e.g., works one shift a week in the emergency room, not that he
or she is salaried by the hospital. The physician privately bills the patients he or she
treats while on rotation duty.
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prongs of the test are placed in direct conflict. The first prong, which
inquires from whom the patient sought treatment, suggests liability
should be imputed to the hospital. In referral cases, the patient
arrives at the hospital without an attending physician and, consequently,
the patient nearly always relies on the hospital for treatment. The
second prong, however, which requires either salary or a significant
relationship between hospital and physician, suggests that the hospital
should not be liable for the physician's malpractice. No salary is paid
to the physician by the hospital and, unlike the emergency room or
ancillary treatment cases, no significant relationship exists between
hospital and physician; the physician directly bills the patient for services
rendered, acts as the patient's attending physician and maintains his
or her principal office outside the hospital facility.
An illustrative case is Vanaman v. Milford Memorial Hospital,84 in
which a child-patient twisted an ankle while trying to elude an at-
tacking bumblebee and was brought directly to the emergency room
of the hospital. The physician who negligently treated the child was an
active member of the staff, performing rotation emergency room duty.
He was not salaried by the hospital but billed the patients directly,
and, under the hospital by-laws, the patients were described as being
referred to him. Plaintiff argued there was an ostensible agency. The
Superior Court of Delaware, however, held the doctrine inapplicable
and found that the physician, as a matter of law, was an independent
contractor. The court noted that under the hospital by-laws the hos-
pital was only a referral service, and held that the fact that the physi-
cian was an active staff member was irrelevant.
The result reached by the superior court was correct under the
Brown test. The second prong of the test, because it requires the fact
of salary, demands a close association between the hospital and physi-
cian. As previously discussed, 85 the ancillary treatment and emergency
room cases require a significant relationship as a substitute for the
requirement of salary. This latter test does not depart from the ra-
tionale underlying the two-pronged Brown test because it still requires
a significant association between hospital and physician. However, no
salary or other indicium of a significant relationship links the hospi-
tal and physician in a referral factual pattern. Thus, if the Brown test
84. -Del. Ch.-, 262 A.2d 263 (Super. Ct. 1970).
85. See text accompanying notes 77-79 .%tupra.
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is applied to the referral cases, as it was by the superior court in Vana-
man, vicarious liability should not be imposed on the hospital.
The Supreme Court of Delaware, however, reversed the superior
court, holding ostensible agency applicable to referral treatment cases. 86
The supreme court effectively abandoned the Brown test; its deci-
sion necessarily eliminates the second prong of the test, the require-
ment of salary (or its counterpart, a significant relationship). A plain-
tiff in Delaware need only meet the first prong of the Brown test, i.e.,
reliance on the hospital for treatment, to recover. The supreme court's
opinion is significant because it suggests a movement toward a new
doctrine, not based on a master-servant relationship, but premised on
the notion that a hospital should be vicariously liable for injury result-
ing from any services which it purports to or does in fact provide to
patients. 87
3. The borrowed-servant doctrine
Cases in which courts have applied the "borrowed-servant" doc-
trine involve somewhat more complex factual situations than those
discussed previously since there are no longer three actors in the
drama, but four: (1) the hospital; (2) the patient; (3) the patient's pri-
vate attending physician (who is here assumed to be an independent
contractor);88 and (4) a negligent medical employee (physician, nurse
or technician) of the hospital. Thus, the doctrine requires exploration
of a different aspect of the hospital-physician relationship. The ques-
tion is not whether the hospital is vicariously liable for the malpractice
of a physician, but whether the hospital or the private physician is
liable when a medical employee of the hospital is negligent. In terms
of doctrine, the inquiry is whether the negligent employee was "bor-
rowed" by the attending physician, thus relieving the hospital of re-
sponsibility. 89
86. -Del.-, 272 A.2d 718 (1970).
87. See Part Ill-B infra.
88. The physician must be an independent contractor or the borrowed servant
doctrine does not apply. If the physician is a servant of the hospital, the hospital
would still be vicariously liable. See e.g., Rural Educ. Ass'n v. Bush, 42 Tenn. App.
34, 298 S.W.2d 761 (1956).
89. The borrowed servant doctrine is applied in every state. See e.g., Norland v.
Washington Gen. Hosp., 461 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1972) (Arkansas-nurse borrowed
servant); Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945)
(nurse not borrowed servant); Parmerter v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp., 196 So. 2d 505
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (jury question whether intern borrowed servant); Kastler
v. Iowa Methodist Hosp., 193 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1971); Danks v. Maher, 177 So. 2d
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The borrowed servant doctrine is premised on the maxim that a per-
son cannot serve two masters. :10 In the traditional right of control test,
the maxim is easy to rationalize. How can a person be subject to the
physical control of two different masters as to the manner and details
of his or her work? However, as noted previously, in Brown v. La
Societ9 Franqaise de Bien Faisance Mutuelle the "right of control"
test was replaced." The hospital is liable if two requirements are met:
(1) the patient seeks particular treatment primarily from the hospital;
and (2) the hospital pays a salary to the negligent physician. The at-
tending privately retained physician, on the other hand, may be held
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the hospital employee under
the right of control test. Because the hospital may be held vicariously
liable under the Brown test, and the attending physician vicariously
liable under the right of control test, both can consistently be "mas-
ters" of the same servant as to the same act. An example may help to
clarify.
Suppose a privately retained surgeon performed open heart surgery
on a patient, and the sponge nurse negligently left a sponge in the pa-
tient's body.92 Since the privately retained surgeon was in charge of
the operation, he or she had the right to control the acts of the nurse,9 3
and, therefore, is vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat
412 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1965) (nurse not borrowed servant): Thompson v. Lillehei.
164 F. Supp. 716 (D. Minn. 1958) (anesthesiologist not borrowed servant): Moeller
v. Hauser. 237 Minn. 368. 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952) (resident physician not borrowed
servant): Stumper v. Kimel. 108 N.J. Super. 209, 260 A.2d 526 (App. Div. 1970)
(resident physician not borrowed servant): James v. Holder. 34 App. Div. 2d 632,
309 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1970) (borrowed servant doctrine jury question-anesthetist):
Hillcrest Medical Center v. Wier, 373 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1962) (nurse not borrowed
servant): Tonsic v. Wagner, 220 Pa. Super. 468. 289 A.2d 138 (1972) (intern and
nurses borrowed servants-but vigorous dissent): French v. Fischer. 50 Tenn. App.
587, 362 S.W.2d 926 (1962) (scrub nurse not borrowed servant): Kemalyan v.
Henderson, 45 Wn. 2d 693. 277 P.2d 372 (1954) (nurse-anesthetist not borrowed
servant): Rose v. Hakim. 335 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1971) (nurse not borrowed
servant).
90. Atwood v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 72 F. 447, 455 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1896). the
court states:
It is a doctrine as old as the Bible itself, and the common law of the land follows
it, that a man cannot serve two masters at the same time: he will obey the one.
and betray the other. He cannot be subject to two controlling forces which may
at the time be divergent.
91. See Part I-B supra.
92. See facts of Rural Educ. Ass'n v. Bush, 42 Tenn. App. 34. 298 S.W.2d 761
(1956).
93. This presents no conceptual difficulty: one licensed physician can have the
right of control over other licensed medical personnel so as to make the latter the
former's servant. See, e.g., McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355. 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
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superior. Yet the hospital is also vicariously liable under the Brown
test if the patient looked primarily to the hospital for surgical assist-
ance and the nurse was a salaried employee of the hospital.94 Thus,
because different tests are used to determine vicarious liability, both
the surgeon and the hospital are "masters" as to the same act of the
same "servant."
Thus, it is hardly surprising that a few courts have recently
launched a serious attack upon the proposition that either the hospital
or the attending physician, but not both, can be vicariously liable for
the tort of a salaried medical employee of the hospital.95 The courts
do not use the analysis suggested above, they pay lip service to the
control test and either circumvent the maxim that one person cannot
serve two masters on more traditional grounds96 or simply ignore it
altogether.9 7 Nonetheless, a majority of courts still adhere to the
maxim and apply the borrowed servant doctrine. 98
The general rules in the borrowed servant area are easy to state.
The basic test is to determine whether the attending physician had
temporary command over the particular negligent act of the hospital
94. Logic dictates that the Brown test applies to nurses and laboratory technicians,
as well as physicians. They, like the physician, are specialists in their work, often
licensed by the state. It should be noted that the administrative act-medical act dis-
tinction propogated in Schloendorff applies to doctors, nurses and laboratory tech-
nicians alike. See Bing v. Thuning, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 4, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 5
(1957). But cf. Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Colo. 280, 443 P.2d
708 (1968)..
95. See, e.g., Graddy v. New York Medical College, 19 App. Div. 2d 426, 243
N.Y.S.2d 940 (1963). The holding of this case, under its particular facts, is an excellent
example of a court's recognition that under the new Brown test the premise that "one
man cannot serve two masters" is no longer logically applicable. The court held the
hospital was vicariously liable for the negligence of a resident anesthesiologist because
the hospital paid him a salary. The court also held the two anesthesiologists in charge
of the department of anesthesiology were vicariously liable because the resident was
under their "supervision" and "control." The court did not discuss the borrowed
servant doctrine, perhaps because it saw no doctrinal inconsistency. See also
Tonsic v. Wagner, 220 Pa. Super. 468, 289 A.2d 138 (1972) (Hoffman, J., dissent-
ing); Scott v. Salem County Memorial Hosp., 116 NJ. Super. 29, 280 A.2d 843
(App. Div. 1971) (hospital and physician could be concurrent masters); Matlick
v. The Long Island Jewish Hosp., 25 App. Div. 2d 538, 267 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1966)
(hospital and surgeon concurrent masters).
96. RESTATEMENT (2d) AGENCY § 226 ("A servant may be the servant of two
masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if the service as to one does
not involve the abandonment of the service to the other"); see McConnell v. Williams,
361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949) (dictum); Tonsic v. Wagner, 220 Pa. Super. 468,
289 A.2d 138 (1972) (Hoffman, J., dissenting); Scott v. Salem County Memorial
Hosp., 116 NJ. Super. 29, 280 A.2d 843 (App. Div. 1971) (concurrent liability).
97. See, e.g., Graddy v. New York Medical College, 19 App. Div. 2d 426, 243
N.Y.S.2d 940 (1963).
98. See cases cited in note 89 supra.
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employee so as to render the latter the physician's borrowed servant. 99
It is presumed that the hospital employee remains a servant of the
hospital and does not become the borrowed servant of the attending
physician. 100 However, these general rules have not been helpful in
particular factual situations. The cases can be best described by di-
viding them into two fact patterns: (1) where the tort occurs during the
operation; and (2) where the tort occurs pre- or post-operatively. 10'
a. Torts which occur during the operation. Generally, the courts
hold only the attending physician vicariously liable for negligent med-
ical acts which occur in his or her presence during the operation, 102
and only the hospital vicariously liable for negligent administrative
acts which occur during the same period.' 03
99. See, e.g., Parmerter v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp., 196 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Hollant v. North Shore Hosp., Inc., 24 Misc. 2d 892, 206 N.Y.S.2d 177
(Sup. Ct. 1960) (hospital must surrender and the physician must assume command
of the servant).
100. See, e.g., Parmerter v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp., 196 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1967); Hollant v. North Shore Hosp., Inc., 24 Misc. 2d 892, 206 N.Y.S.2d
177 (Sup. Ct. 1960); James v. Holder, 34 App. Div. 2d 632, 309 N.Y.S.2d 385 11970).
101. Most cases distinguish between operation torts and pre- and post-operative
torts, because the physician is not present in the latter case. See, e.g., Hillcrest Medical
Center v. Wier, 373 P.2d 45, 48 (Okla. 1962), where the court states: "The doctor
was not present when the work was done and all details as to the time, manner and
position of the patient when the x-ray was taken . . . were left to the discretion of the
hospital."
102. See, e.g., McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949); Norland
v. Washington Gen. Hosp., 461 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1972) (nurse held borrowed servant
for negligence causing rupture of spinal cord while assisting obstetrician during
delivery); Swigerd v. City ofOrtonville, 246 Minn. 399, 75 N.W.2d 217 (1956) (dictum):
Danks v. Maher, 177 So. 2d 412 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1965) (dictum--physician liable
for medical acts during operation). Compare Thompson v. Lillehei, 164 F. Supp. 716
(D. Minn. 1958), in which the court suggests that the result may be different where
two patients are involved, one being a donor. The surgeon is preoccupied with one
patient, and is not liable for the improper administration of anesthesia by an
anesthesiologist to the other patient.
103. New York observed the administrative-medical act distinction before Schloen-
dorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). was over-
ruled in Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). The New
York experience is helpful in explaining the difference between the two kinds of
acts. In theory, a medical act is one in which the professional medical skill and
training of a physician must be exercised, Schloendoiff, supra, and an administrative
act is one that does not require such professional judgment to be exercised. Necolayff
v. Genesee Hosp., 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1946), affd 296 N.Y. 936,
73 N.E.2d 117 (1947) (intern had given wrong patient a blood transfusion; act held
an administrative one for which the hospital was liable, since no professional judg-
ment involved). The test has also been stated in terms of whether the act was
"immediately and integrally" related to treatment. See, e.g., Lewis v. Columbus Hosp..
I App. Div. 2d 444, 151 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1956) (intern carelessly selected wrong
bottle of medicine from cabinet; court held this a medical act because "immediately
and integrally" related to treatment). The distinction between the two kinds of acts
in practice, however, is not always easy to draw. See note 44 supra.
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A good example of the application of the first half of the rule oc-
curred in McConnell v. Williams. 0 4 An intern, assisting the attending
physician in the performance of a Caesarean section, badly burned
the infant's eyes with an overdose of silver nitrate. When the act oc-
curred, the attending physician was busy with the mother, who was
having considerable difficulty. The court believed that the attending
physician during an operation has the same control as does a "captain
of a ship over all on board"'105 and, consequently, held that the in-
tern was his "borrowed servant."
A typical situation in which the hospital is held vicariously liable
for the administrative act of a salaried employee committed during an
operation occurs when a scrub nurse and/or a circulating nurse fails to
make a sponge count and, consequently, a sponge is left in the pa-
tient's abdomen.' 06 For example, in Danks v. Maher'0 the scrub
nurse and circulating nurse failed to make a "lap count," and conse-
quently a 12" by 12" gauze square was left in the patient's abdomen.
The court held that, while the surgeon is in charge in the operating
room in a general sense, the hospital remains in charge with regard to
lap counts. The court emphasized the fact that under the hospital by-
laws the nurses were required to make the count.108
While the administrative act-medical act distinction has no doc-
trinal support in jurisdictions which reject the right of control test, 09
practical considerations may dictate its survival in the borrowed ser-
vant area. The courts have suggested that the operating room is no
place to have an abundance of chiefs; one individual should be in
charge of medical decisions and procedures. Since the patient has
chosen the attending physician, that physician should be in com-
mand and bear all responsibility for negligent acts occurring in the
operating room. The hospital should not be held concurrently respon-
sible since to do so may cause the hospital to attempt to control the
discretion of the private attending physician by imposing regulations
104. 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243(1949).
105. 65 A.2d at 246.
106. See cases collected in note 103 supra.
107. 177 So. 2d 412 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1965).
- 108. Id. at 418.
109. The Brown test does not consider whether the lay hospital has the right of
control. Since right of control is irrelevant, there is no reason to distinguish adminis-
trative and medical acts. See Part I-B-l-b supra. For the distinction between admin-
istrative and medical acts, see note 103 supra.
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on their employees who assist the physician. The courts simply do not
want the hospital to become an intermeddler in the sacred, private
physician-patient relationship. 10
The attending physician, however, should in no event be vicari-
ously liable for purely administrative acts performed by hospital em-
ployees in the operating room. The physician is simply unable to su-
pervise every act performed during a complex operation and should
not be charged with responsibility for purely administrative acts re-
quiring no special skill or training. Moreover the hospital in reality
has the right to control these administrative acts and hospital regula-
tions generally prescribe the manner in which they are to be per-
formed. This, together with the fact that the hospital, not the physi-
cian, ordinarily selects these employees, suggests that the hospital, not
the attending physician, should be vicariously liable for the adminis-
trative acts of hospital employees.
b. Pre- and post-operative torts. When a "borrowed servant" com-
mits a tort pre- or post-operatively, the courts have much more readily
held that the hospital remains the "master" and, consequently, is vi-
cariously liable."' In this factual pattern, most courts draw no dis-
tinction between medical and administrative acts.' 12
Cases in this area suggest that the hospital escapes vicarious lia-
bility only if the hospital employee involved was not negligent in
performing his or her duties. 13 In that instance, the doctrine of res-
pondeat superior does not apply and there is no need for the hospital
to argue the borrowed servant doctrine as a defense. A hospital em-
ployee is not negligent only when he or she carefully performs the acts
ordered by the attending physician and such orders are not patently
erroneous at the time given. For example, if the physician orders tea
110. Cf. Fiorentino v. Wenger. 19 N.Y.2d 407. 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373
(1967): Mayers v. Litow. 154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 316 P.2d 351 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
Il . See, e.g., Stumper v. Kimel. 108 N.J. Super. 209. 260 A.2d 526 (App. Div.
1970) (post-operative care rendered by resident physician): James v. Holder. 34 App.
Div. 2d 632. 309 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1970) (post-operative tort of anesthetist); Moeller v.
Hauser. 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952) (post-operative care rendered by
resident physician); Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296. 163 P.2d 860
11945) (post-operative tort of nurse); Kemalyan v. Henderson. 45 Wn. 2d 693. 277
P.2d 372 (1954): Rose v. Hakim, 335 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1971); Hillcrest Medical
Center v. Wier, 373 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1962). Compare Yorsten v. Pennell. 397 Pa. 28.
153 A.2d 255 (1959): Rockwell v. Stone, 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961) (pre-
operative tort of anesthesiologist).
112. See, e.g., Baidach v. Togut, 8 App. Div. 2d 838, 190 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1959).
amended, 191 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1959) (attending physician can rely on medical com-
petence of resident physician in post-operative care).
113. See 27 Cal. 2d 296. 163 P.2d 860(1945). See cases cited in note Ill supra.
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served to a patient, and a nurse merely places the tea on the bed of the
patient who the nurse knows is unable to drink the tea without assist-
ance, and the tea spills and burns the patient, the hospital remains
vicariously liable because the nurse performed the acts ordered by the
physician in a negligent manner.114 If the order was patently erro-
neous at the time given, i.e., the employee should have recognized that
the order was negligent, the hospital will remain vicariously liable for
the employee's acts, even though performed in a nonnegligent
manner. 115 The physician is also liable for his or her patent negli-
gence. In addition, both the hospital and the physician may be liable
when a hospital employee negligently performs acts ordered by the
physician which are later shown to be erroneous (i.e., not patently
erroneous at the time given)." 16
It should also be noted that the right of control test does not dictate
these results. Under that test, the fact that the attending physician is
absent does not mean he or she loses the right of control. 117 However,
most courts distinguish pre- and post-operative acts of hospital ser-
vants from the operating room acts of those servants on the basis that,
in the former, the physician, being physically absent, does not exert
actual control."18 The courts thus prefer practical considerations over
114. Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945).
115. Kastler v. Iowa Methodist Hosp. 193 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Iowa 1971) ("Doctor's
orders do not insulate hospitals from liability if subsequent circumstances show a need
for change of action, in the exercise of reasonable care"); Rose v. Hakim, 335 F.
Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1971).
116. The issue then may be one of proximate cause. Logically, the same principles
may apply when the physician leaves no orders.
A special problem may arise when the negligence involved the failure to make a
proper diagnosis. Such a failure was alleged in Alden v. Providence Hosp., 382 F.2d
163 (D.C. Cir. 1967), where, under the direction of an attending physician, the
patient was admitted to the hospital with a condition diagnosed as bulbar polio-
myelitis (polio). Neither the attending physician nor the chief medical resident recog-
nized that the patient also had a lung disease. The patient was transferred to another
hospital, and both the attending physician and the chief medical resident signed the
transfer record stating that nothing was wrong with the patient's lungs. As a con-
sequence of the failure to make the proper diagnosis, the patient died. The court held
that the hospital had a "duty" under the circumstances to make a diagnosis and was,
therefore, vicariously liable for the negligence of the medical resident in failing to do
so. Judge Burger wrote a vigorous dissent arguing that the "duty" to diagnose lies with
the attending physician and not the hospital. Id. at 167. It is suggested that the view of
the majority is preferable; when a hospital purports to provide the diagnostic services
of its salaried staff, it should be vicariously liable when the staff performs the task
negligently.
117. Rockwell v. Stone, 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961).
118. Hillcrest Medical Center v. Wier, 373 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1962); Kemalyan v.
Henderson, 45 Wn. 2d 693. 277 P.2d 372 (1954) (physician left room for 10 minutes
when nurse-anesthetist administered anesthesia negligently; verdict against hospital
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legal dogma."19 It is simply not equitable in these situations to hold
the absent physician liable for the routine medical functions custom-
arily provided by the hospital.1 20
C. Other Theories Potentially Resulting in Vicarious
Liability of the Hospital
1. The joint venture or joint enterprise doctrine
The members of a joint enterprise may be held jointly and severally
liable for the negligence of one member.' 2' A joint enterprise exists
when two or more persons engage in a course of action for a common
purpose.' 2 2 The hospital-physician relationship is a perfect example:
Both the hospital and the physician are pursuing a common purpose,
the treatment of the patient. They depend on each other for their eco-
nomic survival.123 Thus, it would seem that a joint enterprise would
exist in every hospital-physician relationship. However, the courts
apparently feel that application of a joint venture rule would impose
vicarious liability on the hospital too broadly. Consequently, they re-
fuse to use joint venture as a basis for holding the hospital responsible
for the malpractice of a physician.124
affirmed); Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945)
(implication); Swigerd v. City of Ortonville, 246 Minn. 399, 75 N.W.2d 217 (1956).
119. Perhaps, too, this is an implicit recognition that there is no real doctrinal
inconsistency in holding both hospital and physician liable under the "two-pronged'"
or Brown test. For lack of policy reasons to exculpate the hospital, as there are in
operating room cases, the courts simply refuse to apply the doctrine. Compare
Rockwell v. Stone, 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961), which held the attending physi-
liable for the negligence of the chief anesthesiologist of the hospital. though the
physician was not present when the negligence occurred. This is an example of the
unfair results under the right of control test in these situations.
120. See note 119 supra. In Baidach v. Togut, 8 App. Div. 2d 838. 190 N.Y.S.2d
120 (1959), the court held the attending physician has a right to rely on the com-
petence of hospital employees to render post-operative care when the physician is absent.
121. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 72, at 475 (4th ed. 1971).
122. Id.
123. Even if the hospital is charitable, it could not serve its charitable purpose
without the assistance of the physician who brings in patients who pay for the
medical services provided by the hospital. See Darling v. Charleston Memorial Hosp..
33 I11. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
124. For example, in Hundt v. Proctor Community Hosp., 5 I11. App. 3d 987.
284 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1972), the Illinois Court of Appeals rejected the patient's joint
venture argument. noting: "the relationship between the hospital and the members of
its statt who are not regular employees of the hospital has traditionally been an
independent relationship even though both parties must cooperate for the purposes
of the hospital to succeed."
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2. The equity doctrine
The equity doctrine is applied when the facts of the case show great
injury to the plaintiff and gross fault on the part of the treating physi-
cian. The court will hold the hospital vicariously liable despite the
existence of rules in the jurisdiction that in ordinary situations would
indicate no liability. One Texas case 125 is sufficient to demonstrate.
A pregnant woman went to Dr. A to have a baby delivered. Because
of complications, Dr. A performed a Caesarean section, successfully
removing one infant. The mother, however, was carrying twins, and
Dr. A, unfortunately, left the other fetus in her body. Her abdomen
thereafter swelled, causing her considerable pain, and her husband
took her to a hospital. Dr. Wagner, the hospital surgeon, after confer-
ring with the hospital administrator, agreed to take the woman as his
patient.126 Dr. Wagner failed to determine the cause of the problem
and 11 days thereafter the fetus had sufficiently decomposed to kill the
mother. The husband sued the hospital for wrongful death. (Appar-
ently neither Dr. A nor Dr. Wagner were amenable to suit).
Under Texas law, the hospital was not vicariously liable under re-
spondeat superior for the negligence of a physician.1'27 Nevertheless, the
court held the hospital liable on an "implied partnership" theory. The
court relied on these facts: (1) hospital stationery used a letterhead
that showed Dr. Wagner as the head surgeon; (2) the hospital and the
surgeon conferred before accepting the promissory notes given to pay
the hospital bill; and (3) both notes were given to the surgeon. 128 This
showing, the court held, was enough to establish a business connec-
tion. The author could find no other case in which a hospital and a
physician were found to be "implied partners" so as to hold the hos-
pital vicariously liable.
II. CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE AND DARLING V.
CHARLESTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Corporate negligence 129 differs from the vicarious responsibility
imposed under the doctrine of respondeat superior in that a nondeleg-
125. Edwards v. West Texas Hosp., 89 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
126. Id. at 806.
127. See, e.g., Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. McTighe, 303 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1957).
128. 89 S.W.2d at 806. The patient signed two notes, one to the hospital for
$87.50, and the second to Dr. Wagner for $27.00.
129. Corporate negligence is the only theory of recovery in jurisdictions that
retain the charitable immunity theory. In these jurisdictions, of course, corporate
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able duty in this instance is owed by the hospital directly to the pa-
tient t3°1 There are, perhaps, four such duties owed by the hospital
under the doctrine of corporate negligence: (1) to use reasonable care
in the maintenance of buildings and grounds for the protection of the
hospital's invitees;' a" (2) to furnish the patient supplies and equipment
free of defects;' 32 (3) to select its employees with reasonable care; 3 3
and (4) to supervise all persons who practice medicine within its
walls. ' 3 4
The third and fourth duties concern the hospital-physician relation-
ship and are important because they may extend the hospital's respon-
sibility to include acts of physicians who would be considered indepen-
dent contractors under the doctrine of respondeat superior.13  Recent
expansion of the third and fourth duties had its genesis in Darling v.
Charleston Memorial Hospital.3 6
As with most revolutionary decisions, Darling arose from extremely
harsh facts. Because a nonspecialist physician for 14 days left on the
plaintiffs leg a cast which cut off circulation, the leg turned blue and
eventually was amputated.' 3 7 Despite obvious signs of malprac-
negligence is of crucial importance. See generally Southwick. MARQ. L. REV.. ,spra
note 6.
130. Southwick, CI-EV.-MAR. L. REV.. ,supra note 6. at 15 1.
131. Id. at 152: ,see Chandler Gen. Hosp.. Inc. v. Purvis. 123 Ga. App. 334. 181
S.E.2d 77 (1971): Norwood Clinic. Inc., v. Spann. 240 Ala. 427. 199 So. 840 (1941).
132. Emory Univ. v. Porter, 103 Ga. App. 752. 120 S.E.2d 668 (1961): Milner v.
Huntsville Memorial Hosp., 398 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966): Carrasco v.
Bankoff, 220 Cal. App. 2d 230, 33 Cal. Rptr. 673 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963): Snipes v.
Southern Baptist Hosp.. 243 So. 2d 298 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1971): Southwick, C1 EV.-
MAR. L. REV.. Napra note 6. at 153.
133. Mitchell County Hospital Authority v. Joiner. 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412
(1972): Hoke v. Glenn. 167 N.C. 594. 83 S.E. 807 (1914): Southwick, 17 CLEV-
MAR. L. REV., sutpra note 6. at 154.
134. Darling v. Charleston Memorial Hosp.. 33 III. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
135. See Mitchell County Hosp. Authority v. Joiner. 229 Ga. 140. 189 S.E.2d
412 (1972). It is difficult to ascertain from the majority opinion whether the particular
physician involved was a salaried employee or not. The dissenting opinion, however.
states that no employer-employee relationship existed. See also Nlauer v. The High-
land Park Hosp. Foundation. 90 Ill. App. 2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 776. 779 (1967) (the
court suggested in dictum that tinder the Darling case, the hospital would be liable
for failure to grant its "'staff privileges" with reasonable care). See also Purcell v.
Zimbleman. 18 Ariz. App. 75. 500 P.2d 335 (1972), in which the court apparently
followed the Mauer dictum and held, citing Darling, that the hospital was charged
with notice of a "staff physician's" incompetence because of three prior malpractice
suits. If the hospital can be held negligent for not terminating an incompetent physi-
cian's staff privileges, the hospital can obviously also be held negligent for granting
the privileges to an incompetent physician in the first place.
136. 33 111. 2d 326.211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
137. Id. at 255.
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tice, the hospital staff failed to intervene. 138 Unfortunately, the court's
opinion contains two ambiguities in the statement of the facts of the
case: (1) it is not clear whether the negligent doctor was a salaried
employee or a private physician; 139 and (2) it is not clear whether the
hospital medical staff were employees of the hospital. 140 It is clear,
however, that the theory of recovery was corporate negligence,' 4 ' not
respondeat superior (which was not argued).
The court stated three significant interrelated, yet distinct, new
concepts in holding the hospital liable. First, the court held that state
health regulations, hospital bylaws and national standards were ad-
missible in evidence to show the standard of care owed by the hospital
to patients. 142 The nonobservance of these standards was not con-
sidered conclusive evidence of negligence. However, the court also
held the hospital's observance of local custom did not conclusively
establish that the hospital had exercised due care. Second, the court
held that the hospital, at least under some circumstances, has a duty
to supervise the specific treatment given a particular patient by a phy-
sician practicing within the hospital facility.' 43 Third, the court
implied that the hospital may have a duty to review the general, over-
all competency of its "staff physicians," and to prevent them from
treating patients for ailments outside their field of expertise.' 44 These
concepts have been interpreted by one commentator 45 and in one
subsequent decision 146 to amount to a broad duty imposed upon a
hospital to supervise the acts of all physicians who use its facilities.
Since it is not logical to suppose the lay board of directors could
supervise the medical acts of physicians, the decision, instead, seems
138. Id.
139. The only hint in the decision is the following: "Dr. Alexander, who was on
emergency call that day, treated him." 211 N.E.2d at 255. Commentators argue that
Dr. Alexander was an independent contractor and not an employee. See Rapp,
Darling and Its Progeny: A Radical Approach to Hospital Liability, 60 Iii. BJ. 883(1972); Southwick, CLEV.-MAR. L. REv., supra note 6, at 160; Note, Torts: The Ex-
panding Liability of Hospitals, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 441, 443 n.13 (1973).
140. This ambiguity was important to the Montana Supreme Court in Hull v. N.
Valley Hosp., 159 Mont. 375, 498 P.2d 136 (1972).
141. 211 N.E.2d at 256. The negligent physician was not a party to the suit
because of a covenant not to sue. Id. at 255.
142. Id. at 257.
143. Id. at 258.
144. Id. at 261.
145. Southwick, CLEV.-MAR. L. REV., supra note 6, at 161.
146. Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972).
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to treat the medical staff as an arm of the corporate hospital. 47 The
act, or failure to act, by the hospital medical staff becomes the act of
the corporate hospital.
A. Hospital's Duty to Supervise Particular Treatment Rendered by
Independent Physicians
The actual holding in Darling was probably that the hospital had a
duty, through its medical staff, to supervise the particular treatment
rendered by the physician.' 48 From this holding, commentators be-
lieved that Darling would revolutionize the hospital-physician rela-
tionship by broadly imposing liability upon the hospital for the mal-
practice of any physician practicing in the hospital. 149
This mass imposition of liability anticipated by the commentators
has not occurred. For instance, the Illinois appellate courtst5 0 have
seized upon the ambiguities in Darling and held that it applies only if
the negligent physician is an employee of the hospital. This reading, of
course, sterilizes the case, since the doctrine of respondeat superior
would impose liability on the hospital in such a situation anyway. At
least one other court has adopted the view of the Illinois appellate
courts. 15 1
The few courts which have read Darling to impose liability upon
the hospital for isolated incidents of malpractice by an independent
147. Southwick, CLEV.-MAR. L. REV., supra note 6, at 161; Purcell v. Zimbleman.
18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972). See also Foley v. Bishop Clarkston Memorial
Hospital, 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881 (1972).
148. This holding was based upon an "arm-of-the-hospital" theory which operates
on the assumption that the physician was not an employee of the hospital but an
independent physician. This theory extends the responsibility of the hospital to include
torts of independent physicians when the hospital has failed, through its medical staff.
to properly supervise treatment of the patient. In essence, the medical staff, whether
salaried or not, is treated as the arm of the hospital board of trustees.
149. See, e.g., Rapp, Darling and Its Progeny: A Radical Approach to Hospital
Liability, 60 ILL. B.J. 883 (1972); Note, Torts: The Expanding Liability of Hospitals,
26 OKLA. L. REV. 441 (1973); Hanson & Stromberg, Hospital Liability for Negli-
gence, 21 HAST. L. REV. I (1969).
150. Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n., 93 Il1. App. 2d 461. 235 N.E.2d
671, 674, (1968): Collins v. West Lake Community Hosp., 12 Ill. App. 3d 903, 299
N.E.2d 326 (1973). The Collins court, in dictum, restricted Darling to the following
facts: (I) the negligent physician must be an employee; (2) the hospital staff is not
qualified to recognize symptoms; (3) there is grossly improper treatment; and (4) the
hospital staff fails repeatedly to report a "multitude" of "glaring obvious signals."
Since these factors were not present, the court upheld a directed verdict for the hospital.
151. See Hull v. North Valley Hosp., 159 Mont. 549, 498 P.2d 136 (1972).
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physician, appear to require a kind of "gross negligence" by the hos-
pital before they will hold the hospital liable. 52 This limitation sug-
gests that the basic holding in Darling will be applied sparingly. The
Darling rationale creates hospital liability for failing to supervise par-
ticular treatment rendered by an independent physician only in cases
where physicians, like the infamous Dr. Nork,153 are allowed to
"butcher" their patients. Darling will perhaps take its place among
those rare cases decided under the "equity theory," discussed pre-
viously.'"
B. Hospital's Duty to Investigate and Review the Overall
Competence of Independent Physicians
While most courts have rejected the basic holding of Darling, they
have embraced its peripheral holding that the hospital has a duty to
investigate and review the general competence of all physicians who
use its facilities.1 55 This includes a duty to use reasonable care when
152. Compare Nolda v. Parker, 17 Ariz. App. 54, 495 P.2d 494 (1972) (Darling
not applied in absence of outrageous conduct) with Collins v. West Lake Community
Hosp., 12 Ill. App. 3d 903, 299 N.E.2d 326 (1973) (negligent physician must be
employee and conduct must be grossly improper).
153. In Gonzales v. Nork, No. 228566 (Sacramento Co. Super. Ct., Cal. 1974),
the physician admittedly performed an unnecessary and unsuccessful laminectomy
and spinal fusion causing the plaintiff to suffer constant pain in his back and legs.
In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the unsuccessful operation had aggravated a
pre-existing gastrointestinal problem and contributed to emotional problems which
led to alcoholism and three suicide attempts.
In awarding $3.7 million in damages ($1.7 million against Dr. Nork), the California
trial court noted that Dr. Nork admitted performing 36 other unnecessary oper-
ations over a 9-year period. Moreover, there was evidence that the doctor had a
practice of operating on false or inadequate findings, avoiding consultation, terrorizing
and deceiving patients to force their consent and falsifying progress reports. Doctor
Nork's defense that his judgment was impaired by addiction to drugs was rejected
by the trial court as contrived and unsupported by the evidence.
The hospital's liability ($2.0" million) was based upon its duty to protect its patients
from malpractice by members of its medical staff. The court ruled that even though
the hospital had no actual knowledge of Dr. Nork's "questionable" practices, it was
negligent for lacking such knowledge because it had failed to investigate after an
earlier malpractice action against Dr. Nork.
It should be noted that before the court's findings were issued, the hospital settled
with the plaintiff for $500,000. Moreover, approximately 26 additional malpractice
actions are reportedly pending against Dr. Nork. Hospital Liable for Surgeon's
Admittedly Unnecessary Operations, 29 THE CITATION 18-19 (1974).
154. See Part I-C-2 supra.
155. See, e.g., Mitchell County Hosp. Authority, 299 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412
(1972) (hospital could be liable for negligence in granting staff privileges); Purcell v.
Zimbleman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972) (hospital could be liable for
negligent failure to terminate staff privileges).
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granting staff privileges and a duty to terminate or limit staff privilege
once the incompetence of a physician becomes known.
The hospital board of trustees generally has the power both to deny
staff privileges. 56 and to revoke or limit staff privileges once they are
granted. 57 Since the board has this power it seems entirely fair to
place a duty upon the board to investigate the general competence of
physicians before staff privileges are granted and to continue to re-
view the competence of physicians on a periodic basis.
A problem arises when the incompetency of the physician is known
to the medical staff but is not communicated to the hospital adminis-
trator or the board of trustees. Should the knowledge of the medical
staff be imputed to the board of trustees? If the medical staff is
comprised *of employees, of course, the hospital is vicariously liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. There is a division of au-
thority when the medical staff is comprised of independent physicians.
At least one court has refused to impute the knowledge of medical
staff to the board, strictly adhering to the requirements of agency
law.' 58 Other courts, however, state that the medical staff is an "arm
of the hospital" and impute their knowledge regardless of their em-
ployee status. '5 9
The courts' inclination to place a duty on the hospital to review the
general competence of independent physicians who treat their patients
within the walls of the hospital is in sharp contrast to the almost unan-
imous rejection of Darling in the context of supervision of particular
treatment rendered by an independent physician.
III. SUMMARY AND SUGGESTION
A. Summary
The undeniable trend among the jurisdictions is to expand hospital
responsibility under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the mal-
156. See, e.g., Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center. 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C.
1963): Monyek v. Parkway Gen. Hosp.. Inc.. 273 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1973) (denial of
staff privileges).
157. See, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbleman. 18 Ariz. App. 75. 500 P.2d 335 (1972)
(hospital could be held liable for a negligent failure to terminate staff privileges):
Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center. 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963) (deny or revoke).
158. Hull v. North Valley Hosp.. 159 Mont. 549. 498 P.2d 136 (1972) (alternative
holding).
159. See, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbleman. 18 Ariz. App. 75. 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
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practice of physicians. The courts have rejected the "right of control"
test 160 and silently applied the "two-pronged" or Brown test 16' in
order to extend the doctrine to cover the malpractice of the physician.
This new test requires the plaintiff to show (1) that he looked pri-
marily toward the hospital for treatment and (2) that the negligent
physician was salaried or had a significant relationship with the hos-
pital. But the "two-pronged" test does not require the plaintiff to
make the impossible showing that the hospital had the right of control
over the manner and details of the treatment rendered by the negligent
physician. This is a significant development because it demonstrates
the ability of the common law courts to adapt an old doctrine to an
increasingly specialized society.
In sharp contrast, however, the courts have basically refused to
read Darling v. Charleston Memorial Hospital162 as expanding the
corporate negligence doctrine to thus impose liability on the hos-
pital for the malpractice of the independent physician. Nonetheless,
the courts have accepted the peripheral holding of Darling that there
is a hospital duty to investigate and review the general competence of
independent physicians. Absent a failure to perform this general duty,
however, the hospital will not be liable for the malpractice of an inde-
pendent physician. Apparently the courts feel that to impose a more
stringent duty might unduly infringe upon the sacred private physician-
patient relationship. 163
In sum, it is clear that the courts would rather work within the
framework of respondeat superior than corporate negligence when
deciding whether a hospital should be responsible to a patient for the
malpractice of a physician.
B. Suggestion: The Enterprise Tort Doctrine
The courts have attempted to incorporate two basic goals in devel-
oping a doctrine applicable to the hospital-physician relationship: (1)
(a) the responsibility of the hospital under the doctrine of respondeat
superior should encompass most instances of malpractice committed
160. See Part I-B-l-a supra.
161. See Part I-B-i-b supra.
162. 33 111. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
163. Cf. Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d
373 (1967); Mayers v. Litow, 154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 316 P.2d 351 (1957).
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within the walls of the hospital and (b) recovery by the plaintiff should
not be predicated upon difficult factual inquiries concerning status of
the tortfeasor; 16 4 and (2) the hospital should not be vicariously liable
for the malpractice of privately retained physicians in order to insure
that the hospital will not become an intermeddler in the sacred private
physician-patient relationship.
Present doctrine is sufficient to insure attainment of the second
goal. However, unless the traditional confines of the doctrine of res-
pondeat superior are abandoned, the first goal can never be attained.
Since that doctrine demands that the plaintiff prove the wrongdoer a
"servant" before the hospital will be vicariously liable, t 65 difficult fac-
tual inquiries must be made.
Both goals, however, can be fulfilled under an "enterprise tort"
doctrine, 16 6 toward which the courts appear to be working. The in-
quiry under this rule is not whether the physician was a servant, but
whether the tort occurred within the scope of the hospital enterprise.
This new concept has, perhaps, already been suggested in the holding
and reasoning of Alden v. Providence Hospital1 67 in which the court
held the hospital responsible for its residents' faulty diagnosis-even
though the attending physician concurred in the diagnosis. The court
reasoned that since the hospital was engaged in providing diagnostic
services, it was responsible when its resident performed such services
negligently. The court made no pretense of inquiring whether the neg-
ligent resident was a servant.
The scope of the enterprise, then, can be defined as any service,
medical or otherwise, the hospital purports to provide the patient.
Since most modern hospitals provide the services of specialists, such
as anesthesiologists, radiologists and pathologists, the hospital will be
held responsible for their malpractice. Also included within the scope
of the enterprise would be the acts of nonsalaried physicians who are
164. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915, 927 (1956):
There is nothing in the record to show that plaintiffs should have been on notice
that defendant West was not an employee of defendant hospital and it cannot
be "seriously contended" that she [the injured patient] was obliged to inquire
whether each person who attended her in said hospital was an employee or inde-
pendent contractor.
165. See note 20 and accompanying text sutpra.
166. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
167. 382 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1967), discussed in note 116 I pra.
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doing rotation service pursuant to active staff membership, since this
is a service rendered by the hospital. 168 However, the malpractice of a
private attending physician would not fall within the scope of the en-
terprise. The hospital does not ordinarily provide nor purport to pro-
vide a patient with an attending physician. Thus, the autonomy of the
private physician and the integrity of the private physician-patient re-
lationship would be maintained.
This new doctrine will obviate the factual inquiry into the status of
the tortfeasor in most situations. It will not, however, relieve the plain-
tiff from the burden of countering the hospital defense of the bor-
rowed servant doctrine, 169 pursuant to which the status of the tort-
feasor must be examined.
The borrowed servant doctrine should be abandoned to the extent
it immunizes the hospital from the negligence of its employees. On the
other hand, the doctrine (or perhaps a new concept of it) should be
preserved so as to allow the hospital to assert it in an action against
the attending physician for indemnity. This would place the burden
on the hospital rather than on the patient to pursue an action against
the physician. This result is desirable since the hospital is in a much
better position than the injured patient to obtain and evaluate the
facts relevant to borrowed servant issues. Thus, the patient could re-
cover from the hospital without countering the borrowed servant de-
fense, and yet the private attending physician would be required to
indemnify the hospital. The hospital would not have to fear an in-
creased tort risk and therefore should not attempt to meddle with the
attending physician's discretion in making medical decisions during an
operation. 70
One further comment should be made. The enterprise tort theory will
result in increased hospital liability for the malpractice of the physi-
cian. Since the hospital is really "innocent" of wrongdoing,171the neg-
ligent physician, and not the hospital, should bear the ultimate respon-
sibility. Present doctrine is sufficient to allow this result. A "master"
held vicariously liable for the tort of a "servant" is entitled to indem-
168. Compare Vanaman v. Melford Memorial Hosp., Inc.,-Del. Ch-, 262
A.2d 263 (Super. Ct. 1970) with Vanaman v. Melford Memorial Hosp., In.,--Del.-,
272 A.2d 718 (1970) (reverses superior court decision).
169. See Part I-B-3 supra.
170. See Part I-B-3-a supra.
171. I.e., the hospital is only vicariously liable.
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nity from the "servant." 172 While not a practical remedy in other con-
texts, physicians usually have quite "deep pockets" and are covered by
malpractice insurance. 173 Indeed, the hospital could require malprac-
tice insurance as a condition of granting staff privileges.
The enterprise tort theory, of course, is based upon vicarious lia-
bility. It does not encompass corporate negligence, i.e., when the hos-
pital owes a duty directly to the patient. But the general duty to super-
vise the overall competence of physicians promulgated in Darling will
complement the enterprise tort theory. If the hospital fails in its Dar-
ling duties, it will be unable to obtain indemnity from the negligent
physician since the hospital is then a joint tortfeasor.1 74 This should
prompt hospitals at least to purge themselves of grossly incompetent
physicians like the infamous Dr. Nork.
Joel D. Cunningham
172. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964).
173. Nearly all physicians have malpractice insurance. In Washington State. one
insurer represents over 80%4 of all physicians licensed to practice. Interview with
Tom Fine, Accounts Supervisor, Aetna Life & Cas. Co., in Seattle. Jan. 16, 1974.
174. Since under the corporate negligence theory the hospital itself is negligent.
it is a joint tortfeasor. and indemnity is not allowed. See, e.g., McFall v. Compagnie
Maritime Beige (Lloyd Royal) S.A., 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463. 471 (1952): High-
way Constr. Co. v. Moses, 483 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1973). Moreover, the common law
does not permit contribution among joint tortfeasors and the hospital might bear the
full cost of compensating the patient for his or her injuries. See, e.g.. Merryweather
v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
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